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Exploring reliability in information systems programmes
ABSTRACT
The recent epidemic of information systems (IS) programme failures worldwide suggests that
the effective management of programmes to cope with uncertainty and achieve mission in the
medium term remains a key challenge. Research into high reliability organisations (HRO) has
shown that it is possible to avoid, trap and mitigate the risks inherent in complex socio-
technical systems. Studies of HROs originally focused on the operation of high risk
technologies but have begun to explore other situations that present a similar need for reliable
performance. One such environment is the IS programme. By comparing and contrasting the
salient features of programme environments and HROs and presenting an in-depth case study
with two embedded units of analysis (two troubled IS programmes), we aim to contribute to
the ongoing debate about IS programme failure and to the theoretical development of
programme reliability.
Keywords: Programme Management, Project Management, Information Systems,
Resilience, High Reliability Organisation
INTRODUCTION
The failure of large scale IS programmes has attracted considerable attention in the media. It
appears that every year billions of pounds are wasted on new IS programmes such as the US
Advanced Automation System project (Nelson, 2007), or the UK National Offender
Management System implementation (National Audit Office, 2009). In 2004, only 29% of
all IS programmes succeeded in meeting their time, budget and specification objectives
(Johnson, 2006). The reasons for IS programme failure are manifold. Commentators have
argued that the contributory factors include ineffective stakeholder management (Nelson,
2007, Cerpa and Verner, 2009) and lack of commitment from business leaders and lack of
cross-functional communication (Shehu and Akintoye, 2010). Increasingly, a concern has
emerged that sole emphasis on achieving more from less, whilst initially laudable in itself,
can also contribute to mission failure in the medium term.
Reliable performance, like safety, shows itself only by the events that do not happen!
(Hollnagel, 2006). Stability from this standpoint can be regarded as a ‘dynamic non-event’
(Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001, p. 69), which is not involuntarily obtained, but has to be
accomplished every day. Failure from this perspective, does not result from a singular failed
component or barrier, but occurs as a result of an inability to respond to unpredictable
changes in the context (Woods and Hollnagel, 2006, p. 14). It is the“intrinsic ability of an
organisation (system) to maintain or regain a dynamically stable state, which allows it to
continue operations after a major mishap and/or in the presence of a continuous stress”
(Woods and Hollnagel, 2006, p. 14). The primary purpose of this study is to explore how
programme reliability can be achieved by keeping performance within a zone of acceptable
variance (Cleden, 2009) (see Figure 1).
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The established strategies for achieving reliability in volatile programme environments are
formal structures, hierarchical decision making and adherence to plans, procedures and
processes and the implementation of standardised risk management methodologies promoted
by institutions such as the Project Management Institute and the Association of Project
Management (de Bakker et al., 2010). However, recent high profile failures of IS
programmes suggest that there was no shortage of formal rules nor prior examples from
which to learn. We find that an over-reliance on the structures and processes intended to
control programme risk and ensure stability, can generate outcomes that are unanticipated
and suboptimal. Likewise, allowing members of the programme too much latitude for
developing and maintaining a repertoire of spontaneous and improvised responses to
unpredictable or uncontrollable programme volatility may also lead to the escalation of
crises.
In order to provide a theoretical framework for our study we draw on the literatures on high
reliability organisations, organisational resilience, and crisis management to help explore how
failures occur in complex systems and how some organisations have developed the ability to
avoid and mitigate them. Studies of HROs originally focused on the management of high
risk technologies but have begun to explore other situations where reliability is paramount
(Roberts, 1990b, Rochlin, 1993). It has been argued elsewhere (Ivory and Alderman, 2005)
that research into HROs offers a compelling alternative and/or expansion to the more
traditional, linear, deterministic approach to managing programmes. However, thus far,
programme reliability has not been the subject of empirical inquiry.
Adopting a processual perspective (Langley, 1999), we investigate the core characteristics of
high reliability in two troubled IS programmes (embedded units of analysis) involving the
same client organisation, a Computer Service Provider (CSP) and two software development
organisations (case study setting). All of the companies are well established in the IT
industry.
In what follows, we first consider the research on IS programme environments and consider
the extent to which there is a similar need for reliable performance to HROs. We then
provide a review of the literature on the core characteristics of HROs and derive our four
research questions. We next introduce the setting for our research and the methods of data
collection and analysis. We then offer a thin description (Snook, 2000) of what happened
across the event sequence before using theory to help explain why events unfolded as they
did. In so doing we aim to contribute to the ongoing debate about IS programme failure and
to the theoretical development of programme reliability.
THE CHANGING NATURE OF IS PROGRAMMES
Organisations are increasingly relying on information systems (IS) that are significantly more
complex, dynamic and distributed than earlier technologies. The design, development and
implementation of IS within a defined scope, timeframe and cost has become ever more
challenging. As dependence on these technologies has grown, the nature of new IS
implementation has changed with the emphasis moving from single projects to the
coordination of multiple projects aligned to business objectives (Maylor et al., 2006, Evaristo
and Van Fenema, 1999).
Programmes are a temporary form of organisation (e.g. Lundin and Soederholm, 1995,
Lundin and Steinthorsson, 2003), rather than just a scale-up of a project (Artto et al., 2009,
Lycett et al., 2004). Whereas a project can be defined as a predefined scope of work delivered
using existing capabilities to achieve agreed outputs in accordance with an authorised case, a
programme is a dynamic collection of related projects and activities that, in combination,
achieve agreed organisational objectives and emergent outcomes, including the creation of
capabilities (Lycett et al., 2004). Programmes are said to be adaptable to changes in the
external environment (Thiry, 2002) but less capable of taking into account internal factors
and conditions such as power dynamics and relationships (Lycett et al., 2004). With the focus
on strategic goals, programmes are a vehicle of organisational change, renewal and capability
development. Examples range from information systems implementations (e.g. National
Audit Office, 2009) to construction initiatives (National Audit Office, 2001).
ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS THAT REQUIRE HIGH, RELIABLE
PERFORMANCE
Whilst there are clear differences across organisations and sectors, IS programmes and
reliability seeking organisations (Koch, 1993), share three analogous challenges posed by
their environments: the potential for significant loss, interactive complexity and competing
goals and interests.
The potential for significant loss
Over the past twenty five years, research has been conducted in a large number of high
reliability organisations that operate in high hazard environments but have far fewer ‘errors
than one would expect, given the nature of its inherent hazards’ (Rochlin, 1996) and they
almost never experience an operating failure of grievous consequences (LaPorte and
Consolini, 1991). Studies originally included US Navy carrier aviation (e.g. Rochlin et al.,
1987), the Federal Aviation Administration’s air traffic control operations (Schulman,
1993b), commercial nuclear power plants (LaPorte and Lasher, 1988) and offshore platforms
(Bea, 2002). As Weick and Sutcliffe (2001, p. 18) note, these HROs
‘have a big incentive to contain the unexpected because when they fail to do so, the
results can be catastrophic. Lives can be lost, but so can assets, careers, reputations,
legitimacy, credibility, support, trust and goodwill’.
Any failure of these hazardous technologies is perceived by operators and the public to have
such potentially grave consequences as to warrant their absolute avoidance.
More recently, researchers have explored HRO theory in other ‘ordinary’, low hazard
environments (Zohar and Luria, 2003) that also present a need for reliable performance such
as police (Roberts et al., 2008), healthcare (Vogus and Sutcliffe, 2007), train operations
(Jeffcott et al., 2006) and railways (Busby, 2006), electricity provision (Roe and Schulman,
2008), software firms (Vogus and Welbourne, 2003), banking (Roberts and Libuser, 1993),
microcomputer firms (Eisenhardt, 1989b), and schools (Reynolds et al., 2006).
These environments differ from the contexts of the original HRO studies in two important
ways. Firstly, in some of these contexts cost of failure is grave, but not necessarily life
threatening. Secondly, managers often do not have command and control over the
organisation’s technical core (Roberts, 2009). However, these environments also suffer from
adverse events that are “physical, cultural, and emotional event[s] incurring social loss”
(Vaughan, 1996, p. 292). The failure of IS programmes has the potential for significant
disruption, data loss, damage to reputation and may even jeopardise long-term business
survival. Failures of IS programme events that have caught public and media attention have
been widespread and have occurred in the private, public and voluntary sectors and in many
industries. While research has focused on major incidents, IS programme failures also occur
frequently beyond the public gaze.
Interactive complexity
Reliability seeking organisations tend to operate in environments that are interactively
complex (Perrow, 1984, Zohar and Luria, 2003). Interactive complexity increases when
outcomes are unknown and potentially unexpected, socio-technical systems are multifaceted
with incompatible functions, and where information flow is indirect and ambiguous (Roberts,
1990a). Interactive complexity is often associated with but does not necessarily co-exist with
tight coupling (Schulman, 1993a). Tight coupling includes ‘time dependent processes’,
‘invariant sequences of operations’, ‘the only way to reach the goal’, and ‘little slack’
(Roberts, 1990b). According to the Perrow (1984), failure is an ‘inherent property’ of
interactively complex and tightly coupled systems because they will inevitably experience
accidents that cannot be foreseen or prevented. Perrow (1984) called these ‘normal
accidents’. Environments such as extended construction or IS programmes requiring
significant technology and infrastructure management have high levels of social and technical
interactivity. In these circumstances, people, complex technologies and physical assets
become crucially interdependent. This tight coupling means that error in any particular
process or activity can quickly cascade into more significant events and potentially lead to
destabilisation or failure of the whole, an effect which is especially relevant in non-repetitive
processes such as programme design and management.
Competing goals and interests
A focus on reliable performance is also essential when there are clear tensions between
competing organisational goals such as production targets, and risk and safety goals (Leveson
et al., 2009) or a potential trade-off between thoroughness and efficiency (Hollnagel, 2006).
People balancing multiple goals will tend to take greater risks (Woods and Hollnagel, 2006)
and rarely have the courage to sacrifice production and efficiency goals when faced with
‘warning signs’ of impending problems (Woods, 2006). Thus,
“When organizations focus on today’s profits without consideration of tomorrow’s
problems, the likelihood of accidents increases” (Roberts and Bea, 2001, p. 74).
For example, Vaughan (1996) reports that NASA was under heavy political pressure and in
danger of having its budget cut at the time of the ill-fated Challenger launch.
As programmes are temporary in nature, with people and organisations entering and leaving
the programme environment, achieving goal congruence between the parties involved in the
programme, is particularly difficult to achieve. In programmes which often have elongated
timescales, an overemphasis on reducing costs in the design and inception phases can
threaten the quality of service provided and the viability of the programme in the long-term.
Programmes delivered over protracted timeframes create conditions where traditional lean
models may prove too ‘fragile’ to be effective. Removing slack (dubbed waste) also limits
flexibility in terms of ‘space to experiment’ and ‘time to think’ (Lawson, 2001, Lamming,
1996) and this impedes organisational learning and performance improvement.
Some organisations have developed the ability to operate effectively in volatile environments.
They have become known as high reliability organisations.
THE CORE CHARACTERISTICS OF HIGH RELIABILITY ORGANISATIONS
Leveson, Durac and Marais (2009) argue that high reliability organisations exhibit four
essential organisational characteristics.
First, HROs prioritize both reliability and performance and consensus about the goals across
the organization (Leveson et al., 2009). HROs find an appropriate balance between both
productivity and safety goals (LaPorte and Consolini, 1991) and “consensus about these goals
is unequivocal” (Leveson et al., 2009, p. 239). HROs are said to have a preoccupation with
failure (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001), that enables them to remain sensitive to the possibility of
failure (Hollnagel, 2006). For Woods (2006, p. 29),
“effective balance seems to arise when organisations shift from seeing safety as one
of a set of goals to be measured (is it going up or down?) to considering safety as a
basic value”.
This leads to our first research question:
RQ1: To what extent do programmes find an appropriate balance and consensus
between reliability and other performance goals (e.g. scope, timeframe and cost)?
Second, HROs promote a culture of reliability in simultaneously decentralized and
centralized operations (Leveson et al., 2009). HROs find a way for centralisation based at
the collective level to coexist with decentralisation at the individual level by exhibiting an
adaptive, flexible or ‘organic’ nature (Weick et al., 1999).
Our second research question is as follows:
RQ2: To what extent do programmes reconcile the tension between the need for
centralisation (formal structures, hierarchical decision making and adherence to
plans, procedures and processes) and the need for decentralisation (anticipation of
problems followed by rapid, improvised and mindful responses)?
Third, HROs maximise the learning from accidents, incidents and near misses (Leveson et
al., 2009). HROs believe that errors, incidents and near misses provide a potential for
understanding. They tend to treat errors as windows that reveal the status and health of the
system. People in HROs are reluctant to simplify explanations (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001),
and are wary of interpreting information out of context. HROs are conscious of the labels,
clichés (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001) and categories (Langer, 1989) that can stop them from
exploring events deeply. iven that the costs of failure are so high, learning from trial and error
is impracticable; HROs compensate by using “imagination, vicarious experiences, stories,
simulations, and other symbolic representations of technology and its effects” as substitutes
(Weick, 1987).
Our third research question is:
RQ3: To what extent is learning, particularly from errors, incidents and near misses,
achieved in programmes?
Fourth, HROs make extensive use of redundancy (Leveson et al., 2009). Reserve capacity
allows systems to cope with unexpected circumstances (Rochlin et al., 1987). Redundancy is
developed by duplicating technologies (e.g., backup computers) or people (e.g., more than
one person is capable of performing a critical task) (LaPorte and Consolini, 1991). Time is
also regarded as an important resource and slack is added to the decision making process,
enabling actors to assess the effects of their decisions first, without affecting the overall
system (Lawson, 2001). In this way, the potential consequences of faulty decisions may be
understood before they actually escalate into major failure (Hollnagel et al., 2006).
Our final research question is
RQ4: To what extent is redundancy (e.g. technological, human and time) created,
fostered and used in programmes?
This study aims to address these four questions by means of a case study with two embedded
units of analysis (troubled IS programmes).
SETTING AND METHODS
The research methods comprise a single in-depth case study approach (Stake, 1995) with two
embedded and linked units of analysis (IS programmes), underpinned by a processual
perspective (Eisenhardt, 1989a, Pettigrew, 1990, Langley, 1999), paying attention to the
programme context and sequence of critical events (Buchanan and Dawson, 2007). Process
studies of single case study organisations have become increasingly prominent in
management and organisation studies (Langley, 1999). For example, three Academy of
Management prize-winning papers were process studies based on archival data and
retrospective interviewing (Isabella, 1990, Dutton and Dukerich, 1991, Plowman et al.,
2007). With a single case, or a small number of cases, the aim is not to generalise from
sample to population, but from experience and observation to theory through a process of
analytical refinement (Tsoukas, 2009) (also called analytical generalisation). As we are
focusing on specific IS programmes, we will seek themes that emerge from this case and then
compare them to the findings from the literature on programme management and high
reliability organisations, as discussed above, in order to make more general propositions
about programme reliability in general.
Data elicitation
The two programmes chosen for this study (which, for purposes of anonymity, we have
referred to as Alpha and Beta) were both part of a major IT transformation for a Defence
client, whom we have called Def. Ltd, and had both experienced serious pressures. At the
time the study was carried out, the programmes were considerably over budget and delayed.
The data collected were both real time and retrospective. The study was initiated at the
critical period of ‘Rescue and Salvage (see Figure 3) which was worthy of particular attention
because this phase provided insights into the possible discontinuation of both programmes.
Both programmes involved were chosen for their strategic importance, i.e. the
implementation of a major information system which, if it failed, could even threaten the
viability of the client.
The client for both programmes, is a major player in the Defence industry. As a main
contractor they used a Computer Service Provider (CSP) whom we have named All Inc.
Solution. Typical services provided by this company include “planning, operation,
implementation and use of computer hardware, computer software and computer personnel”
(Howard, 2001, p. 2). Examples of programmes include “Roll Outs” and the implementation
of “User Help Desk” structures or “Outsourcing” programmes. In 2007 in the UK, such
services alone represented £22.3 billion in turnover, having increased by 5.6% on 2006, for
the stand-alone CSPs of which approximately 50% of this service volume was delivered
through programme work (Howard, 2001, p. 8). The strategic importance and costs involved
in developing IT systems have raised the stakes associated with the programme outcomes
(Keil, 1995).
The task of the CSP All Inc. Solution was to integrate a software solution on a hardware
platform. In the programmes Alpha and Beta, the development of the software solution was
done by two other CSPs subcontracted to All Inc. Solution; an organisation we have called
Dellsys in the case of Alpha. All companies are well established in the IT industry and have a
track record of IS successes. All companies, including the client Def. Ltd are active
worldwide and yet the results show that the integration between software and hardware may
be more challenging than expected.
Langley (Langley, 2009) argues that the data sources for the examples of process research
typically comprise some or all of the “big three” of qualitative research: observation
(participant or non-participant), interviewing (retrospective or real-time; individual or group)
and archival documents (internal or external; public or private). In total, 25 semi-structured
interviews were carried out with a 20 key stakeholders for each project. Most interviews took
place during the critical phase of Salvage and Rescue and some were repeated every 3 - 4
months. They varied in duration between 1 and 3 hours depending on the amount of events
and closeness to them.
The selection of the respondents was purposeful (see Table 1). First, individuals who were
singled out had the greatest in-depth knowledge about the two programmes; however, we
made sure that we questioned a variety of managers at different hierarchical levels who were
specialists or generalists in their field. Second, the retrospective examination of the phases
before Salvage and Rescue required interviewing, for example, programme managers that are
now not actively involved any more in Alpha and Beta. It is interesting to note that most
changes to the hierarchy throughout the phases have been done at a programme management
and project management level.
Table 1: List of respondents in programmes Alpha and Beta
Organisation Alpha Beta
Def Ltd. 1 x Account executive
(interviewed twice)
1 x Relationship manager 1 x Relationship manager
1 x Programme manager
(interviewed twice)
1 x Programme manager
(interviewed twice)
1 x Programme Management Office director
2 x Project manager 2 x Project manager
(interviewed four
times)
1 x Project manager
1 x Solution specialist 1 x Solution
specialist
2 x Solutions specialist
All Inc Solutions 1 x Programme manager
(interviewed twice)
1 x Project manager 1 x Project manager
1 x Solution specialist
All Inc-Subco 1 x Programme manager
The questions that were asked revolved around a key ‘incidents’ or ‘events’ or ‘what
happened?’ and followed questions on the impact, explanations of causes and whether
anything was learnt from the event. The ladder of questions was extended to understand the
trigger that made the event possible and how programme resilience was affected.
Documentation such as risk logs, schedules and status reports were analysed and the results
discussed with the participants. Information derived from document analysis was compared
with the findings from the interviews to gain insight into the phases, manner and content of
management in programmes.
Data derivation
Langley (1999) proposes seven strategies for making sense of process data: narrative;
quantification; alternate templates; grounded theory; visual mapping; temporal bracketing;
and synthetic strategy. Our approach was to adopt a combination of three of these
approaches. We developed a detailed story from the raw data (narrative strategy), produced
several timelines and graphical displays (visual mapping) and decomposed the overall
programme timelines into six successive periods (temporal bracketing) related to the phases
of the Disaster Incubation Model (Turner, 1976): (1) starting point, (2) incubation period, (3)
precipitating event, (4) onset, (5) rescue and salvage, (6) full cultural readjustment (see
Figure 1). The case studies were produced using a multi-methods approach, primarily
qualitative, relying on a combination of semi-structured interviews and local documentation.
The result of the data elicitation phase was a mass of data that needed to be organised. Firstly,
the temporal decomposition into phases enabled an explicit view into the logical sequence of
events. Such decomposition of data enables the explicit examination of how action or
inaction of one phase affects subsequent phases. Events, actions, feelings and other salient
indicators were mapped at different hierarchical levels. For, example, the simplified extract in
Figure 2 highlights not only the issue of lack of interaction during the incubation phase
between All Inc. Solution and Def. Ltd but also within All Inc. Solution related simplification
of concerns raised at an operational level.
Figure 2: Simplified extract from process flowchart
These visual forms of interpretation have been shared with the participants in the study for
the purpose of validation. Predominantly defined as a data-driven approach, this method
enabled us to derive findings that are helpful to examine programme reliability in a new light.
The findings are split into two parts. We first provide a brief thin description (Snook, 2000)
of what happened across the six time periods before; secondly, we analyse the two
programmes through the lens of HRO theory to help explain why events unfolded as they did,
why decisions were taken, why changes have or have not occurred, and the consequences.
FINDINGS
The starting point with Programme Alpha (see Figure 3) started in October 2006. The
involved parties agreed on the systems requirements. All parties set out with the misguided
assumption that the programme involved the straightforward implementation of an “off the
shelf” product with the subcontractor Dellsys being in charge of the application and All Inc.
Solution being responsible for the infrastructural platform. Def. Ltd defined their
requirements, while Dellsys evaluated the ‘fitness’ of the existing application. As it stood,
the system chosen for the programme Alpha was perceived not to require any further
customisation.
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Shortly after the contract was signed, Dellsys requested some customisation. In October
2006, Dellsys determined that all the required customisation could be accommodated within
two releases. However, the acceptance of the system was refused in May 2007. Dellsys
called in an audit team to investigate the refusal by Def. Ltd. From that stage, the period of
incubation was marked by an iterative cycle of patching, testing, raising issues and fixing
them.
In October 2007, awareness set in that management had lost sight of the development of
Alpha. Cost and time overruns were the result. Another audit, this time a joint audit by Def.
Ltd/Dellsys was carried out. Dellsys claimed not to be able to keep pace with the changing
requirements. As a result of the discrepancy, testing times were increased,
“So that gives you an indication of what the domino effect was, that as soon as one
slipped, it put more pressure on the next release, without actually changing any of the
dates because politically, people had to hit the dates for the benefits case and you're
not allowed to fail in [Def. Ltd]. You're not allowed to say no.” (Interview data)
During the precipitating event, in March/April 2008, ten months later than scheduled, a pilot
and acceptance testing was carried out. In January 2009, the system went ‘live’.
Nevertheless, during onset, stability issues arose. In a period of rescue and salvage, 10
weeks of ‘fire fighting’ were necessary to find a resolution to the stability problems. Despite
the delay and budget concerns, during full cultural readjustment members of the senior
management reframed the programme as a success:
“Have we delivered what we said we'd deliver? Yes. So, having got to the end of it,
we can say it's a success… Despite all the things that have caused us to be 35% over
budget and 50% over time-wise, we've delivered.” (Interview data)
As a result of this reframing, at the end the data collection, relationships between
organisations remained awkward, informants suggested that issues lay dormant, bugs and
issues were left unresolved, and neither party had effectively made the full cultural
readjustments required to prevent recurrence.
Programme Beta followed a similar pattern (see Figure 3). In this case, the starting point
involved the parties Def. Ltd, All Inc. Solution defining and committing themselves to
software and hardware specifications. Workshops to define the requirements of the
programme in more detail were carried out in October 2006.
June 2007 saw the first release of the system Beta. Already at that stage, problems were
occurring during incubation but signals that the programme was in trouble were missed,
masked and de-emphasised and, left unattended, these faults, errors and problems quickly
escalated. The system did not run in a stable manner and functionalities did not materialise as
expected. Despite the initial setbacks, due to growing pressures to meet deadlines, the
planned times for launching further releases were not moved back – this was the precipitating
event.
In March 2009, during onset, a further release was implemented and went live. However, the
problems incurred by the previous releases added to the complexity of the entire non-
performing system and the programme team lost sight of how to overcome the increasing
problems with Beta. In March 2000 rescue and salvage was achieved by an external team of
specialists who were set up to carry out a high level audit on Beta and devise a suitable
solution to break the cycle of testing, patches and errors.
In 2009, Beta was considerably delayed and over budget. Once again, no cultural
readjustment occurred and the programme outcome was again described as a success. The
programme manager argued:
“The [Beta] programme Release D in itself, in my opinion, was a huge success in
what we did because we're one of the only companies who's managed to do a four tier
PLM architecture deployment on a global scale. Not many other companies, I
believe, have managed to do it successfully.” (Interview data)
Figure 3: Timeline of programme Alpha and Beta
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To help explain the case, we now draw on the four primary aspects of High Reliability
Theory outlined above. These are: identification and prioritisation of shared goals,
organisational learning, simultaneous decentralised and centralised operations, and the use of
redundancy.
Identification and prioritisation of shared goals
In both the programmes Alpha and Beta, the gateway review led to a definition of a business
case, in which requirements were defined and agreed upon. It was clear that all parties
involved were over-confident and possibly complacent from the starting point:
“And indeed, they gave a commitment there that whatever customisation they did,
they would include it in their [off the shelf] product within two releases. So, on that
basis, we went forward with it.” (Interview data)
The degree of faith and confidence in the guaranteed success of the programme was
reinforced by many of the programme and account managers.
“… we’ve had a long period of pretty successful SAP implementations and
deliveries, and we have generally been quite successful on timescale and cost over a
ten year period.”
Determining the priority of goals in both programmes also revealed a confusing picture.
Senior management at the client Def. Ltd emphasised that the primary goal of both
programmes was to provide the end-user with an information system that was perceived to be
useful and easy to use. Yet, this perception was not shared:
“There’s pressure from [Def. Ltd] to keep the cost down at the start of the programme,
and there’s pressure from [Def. Ltd] to, you know, to deliver to a certain date.”
(Interview data)
The result of that pressure was the curtailing of testing times and the questioning of suppliers’
estimates of work packages by Def. Ltd (see redundancy). In some cases, the estimated
resource requirements were downgraded to a level only to be accepted by Def. Ltd.
There was also significant pressure to hit deadlines. Due to previous delays in launching
‘releases’ of the information system, the importance of meeting original time commitments
became more prevalent:
“Loads of additional work came in, but the date couldn't move. It had been
communicated to the business. So we were up against… And the guys, the technical
guys upstairs, just worked every weekend for, like, six weeks. They worked stupid
hours. And we just said we'll focus on the build and get it in and the programme will
have to support it while we write up all the documentation afterwards.” (Interview
data)
Despite the increasing amount of problems that emerged, baselines were not moved.
Consequently, first the workload increased. Second, greater risk taking that involved more
and more issues (such as stability issues) were waived and “no go decision was never really a
no go.” (Interview data) and supposedly error-free IS releases were launched:
“Because they have political dates to hit. We must hit it or we'll go into the change
freeze, we'll lose the benefits case. I mean, as I say, I actually wrote five or six
paragraphs on it, a saga, and the Chief of [Def. Ltd] just ignored it, as did my
counterpart, the programme manager that I faced off to. He just [said] ‘thanks very
much, we're buying off the risk’, their decision.” (Interview data)
Third, not surprisingly, greater tensions arose between Def. Ltd and their suppliers:
“I had a huge fall out with the Chief of [Def. Ltd] in that Christmas and basically just
said you're not listening to what the delivery team are telling you. You're still driving
us to March, it's impossible. The plan we look at is talking about August/September.
We don't have the resources, we don't have the skills, we don’t have the time and we
don't have any testing in there. We have like two weeks testing, okay. So you're gonna
go live and this thing underpins all your business, and you're going to risk the
business with two weeks’ testing.” (Interview data)
In HROs there is a preoccupation with failure (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001). However,
respondents were not aware of the importance of the programmes that they were working on
and the possible costs of failure:
“I don’t know what the quantified impact is, to be honest. I would need to find that
out.” (Interview data)
“…I’m not 100% on what the business impact is but there will be one. This
programme going live is a dependency for other programmes that I’m aware of, so
they will also be impacted.” (Interview data)
It is not surprising that balancing and achieving consensus on goals was difficult at first – key
stakeholders in these programmes were not aware of the impact of failure. Second, the goal
of a resilient information system was incongruent with efficiency measures. The erosion of
the goal of IS resilience was caused by past failure to meet deadlines and increasing pressure
to reign in costs that were escalating due to the unexpected problems that emerged in a tightly
coupled system that those close to the programmes claimed to be a ‘simple off the shelf’
implementation.
Simultaneous decentralised and centralised operations
In both Alpha and Beta, a strong top-down approach could be observed. Those who were
considered close to the ‘coal face’ had little or no discretion to act. The capability of
localised decision making was limited. Required changes often needed to be escalated to
higher authorities. Centralisation was also evidenced by the unchallenged compliance with
the rules and procedures imposed by Def. Ltd:
“So, you know, for example, if we need to instal a new server into an existing server
room, connect it to the [Def. Ltd] network, there’s no way that we would be able to
bypass any of the processes that are replaced to protect that environment from
cowboys like us coming along. So, you know, we must put in our request to make a
change to the production environment, you know, at least one week in advance of
doing it. We won’t get that request granted unless we’ve passed all the necessary
programme phase quality gates before we get to that point. We must fill in our
questionnaires that go round to the 25 different stakeholders within the [All Inc.
Solution] leverage team organisations, to get approval for our programme to proceed
beyond a certain point…. not even your Theme Lead or your Programme Director in
the organisation has the authority to say, ‘No, this is a royal train, we’ll bypass all of
this,’ it just doesn’t happen.”
The ultimate decision to launch a release is taken by chief programming engineers. The
decision is influenced by systems engineers:
“I’m just trying to enforce the point that the final decision would rest with them but
it’s almost to the level where we’re both making a decision because we’ve given that
recommendation which, not forces, but strongly says, that this is the view to be
taken.” (Interview data)
Neither information systems specialists nor end-users alike have a ‘veto’ to prevent the
launch of a release from happening,
“No, I don’t think there’s [any point] trying to get too hung up on that point. We
would always give a strong recommendation, and it will never be a weak
recommendation. The point was just that, you know, we would try to promote one
option which we feel is best.” (Interview data)
The launch of releases in programmes Alpha and Beta were mainly driven by Def. Ltd, at
times against the concerns raised by All Inc. Solution. Overall, the programmes appeared to
be top-down with lead times that did not do justice to the constant changes in the IS
development. The ‘launch’ decision was highly centralised and hierarchical.
Organisational learning
Weak signals of failure were evident throughout the period of incubation and programme risk
management procedures were in place to encourage learning about the unknown. However,
management of risk only appeared to confirm that the desired solution was ‘simple’:
“I assumed that Dellsys knew what they were doing.” (Interview data)
Further, there was limited scanning and sensemaking (Weick, 2009) of the changing context
by the programme team. Rather than critical reflection, deviations from the plan were
passively downgraded, ignored or accepted:
“I think the way it was, was when we did the new plan to get the civil instance into
production we raised a load of planning assumptions and risks around that schedule
and they were bought off by [Def. Ltd]. Because the blind optimism of the [Def. Ltd]
programme was that this will work, that the fact that they knew it was gonna be issues
to them I was saying, ‘Well, if you’re going for a date operational readiness should be
what it is, you are ready to go live.’ It was not ready to go live and it was lucky it
only picked up five reds because it could have picked up six or seven if there’d have
been a less political sensitivity because it’s a joint gate between [Def. Ltd] and [All
Inc. Solution] so it’s [Def. Ltd] telling [Def. Ltd] to slow down and put all this testing
in place.” (Interview data)
Overall, a blind faith in the competence of the providers prevailed. At no point did any senior
members of the team question the core assumptions and premises of the programmes. The
performance of risk management exercises appears to have reinforced situational blindness
and the status quo.
Provision of redundancy
In the programmes Alpha and Beta, the ability to act locally if necessary is further
constrained by the availability of specialist resources. In the case where capacity is required
to adapt to changes in the programme, lead times hamper the ability for immediate action
(interview data). For efficiency gain, a leveraged model was applied in Alpha and Beta. The
aim was to fully utilise resources, in particular those that were critical to the success of the
programmes:
“What we are doing is planning and resourcing and we want a plan that we think is
gonna be deliverable because we need to give the resource groups a heads up on when
they need to supply their leverage staff, we need to do the resource levelling, we need
to work out who we really need and if we haven’t got enough then we’ve got enough
lead time in the plan to get those resources in from somewhere else; never happened.”
(Interview data)
The availability and planned access to resources was further limited by unwillingness to share
the burden of slack resources:
“And then, it's a case of but we're driven by being on time and materials contract and I
can't invest.... I wanted to bring a quality manager in, okay? Last year, I said to my
manager, can I bring a quality manager in to start, you know, being the policeman and
make sure we do the processes, that we do the right thing? Only if [Def. Ltd] fund it.
Well can't that be our investment? Only if [Def. Ltd] fund it. [Def. Ltd], will you pay
for a quality manager?” (Interview data)
The drive for lean programme management and the attention of efficiency measures left
programmes Alpha and Beta in vulnerable positions. First, and in particular, specialist
software engineers were not available to form slack resources. Second, the volatility of the
programmes seems not to have allowed a form of planning certainty that is necessary for a
leveraged model to work. Third, the ambiguous distribution of the burden of using slack
resources led to highlighting the competitive and blame led culture.
TOWARDS A FRAMEWORK FOR PROGRAMME RELIABILITY
Our case study has shown that the challenges presented by the high potential for loss,
interactive complexity, and competing goals and interests, were amplified in a rapidly
changing programme environment. In programmes, it is impossible to plan with certainty
(Packendorff, 1995) as they are likely to unfold in unique, unpredictable and unexpected
ways (Cleden, 2009). Due to the interactive complexity of the programmes there were
“unfamiliar, unplanned, or unexpected sequences of activities that were not visible or
immediately comprehensible” (Roe and Schulman, 2008, p. 53). The programmes moved
from a state of relative stability to high volatility. High volatility is characterised by
uncontrollable changes or unpredictable conditions (Roe and Schulman, 2008). This volatility
can be produced by factors, conditions and mechanisms that are internal or external to the
programme. Our data also show that managers attempted to use a variety of strategies to
achieve programme reliability.
Roe and Schulman argue that reliability is achieved by, “developing and maintaining a
repertoire of responses and options in the face of unpredictable or controllable system
volatility” (Roe and Schulman, 2008, p. 41). By building and further extending their
framework, we argue that there are four approaches to achieving programme reliability (see
Figure 4). According to Roe and Schulman (Roe and Schulman, 2008), reliability is also
achieved by dynamically matching the contextual conditions with appropriate mechanisms
and approaches. Problems occur when there is a mismatch between the strategy and the
circumstances or when the organisation has a preoccupation with one approach.
Figure 4: Four approaches for achieving programme reliability
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When programme managers have multiple options at their disposal and the volatility inside
and outside the programme is low, reliability can be achieved by means of control. Risk
management processes allow programme managers to identify and put in place strategies to
ameliorate potential risks. Slack is built into the programme in the form of technical backups,
additional actors, or space and time to consider options. During periods of relatively low
volatility, decision making can be centralised. Changes to specifications, however small, can
be ‘signed off’ by authority, and decision-making processes can be slow and thorough.
Coordination is achieved through standardisation of a wide range of established policies,
procedures, processes and practices. Little communication is required across the members of
the organisations involved in the programme. In periods of low volatility, it is important to
guard against overconfidence and complacency. Thus vigilant watchfulness (Roe and
Schulman, 2008) is required to anticipate, surface and act upon early warning signs of
changing conditions.
Our study shows that slack resource was hard to justify in programme environments. Both
Alpha and Beta drew on a small pool of skilled people and embraced a fixed set of beliefs
relating to the need for ‘lean’ (meaning ‘waste free’) programme delivery. The result was
stretched resources leading to a brittle programme environment. Through a process of
practical drift (Snook, 2000) local action often departs from written procedure, creating
loopholes in the system’s defences. Our data showed that members of the programme also
developed a false impression of low system volatility from the outset, believing that the
programme was a simple implementation of an off-the-shelf product. They also adhered to a
reductionist model and approaches that oversimplified explanations, hindering the detection
of a deteriorating performance. Weick and Sutcliffe (2001, p. 74) note that: ‘With every
problem, someone somewhere sees it coming. But those people tend to be low rank, invisible,
unauthorized, reluctant to speak up. In our study, weak signals of impending problems were
detected by people in the programmes but this information was not acted upon.’
Adjusting: maintaining reliability
When volatility increases due to changes in programme or the external environment, rapid
and flexible responses are required (Roe and Schulman, 2008). Reliability in this mode is
achieved when timely action is taken and changes made before unforeseen incidents and
events become too costly. Cleden (2009) highlights the critical role of the programme
manager and members of the programme in achieving reliable performance by applying
‘dynamic controls’. Those with operational expertise are empowered to make quick decisions
and take corrective action when unexpected situations arise (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2006).
Actors create new practices by inventing solutions with the resources available through
bricolage (de Certeau, 1984). Coordination is achieved through people talking in real time
(mutual adjustment) (Mintzberg, 1983).
Our data show that reliability breaks down in this mode when repeated successful operations
lead to the misconception that the application of ‘fine-tuning’ (Starbuck and Milliken, 1988)
is working, thereby creating and reinforcing an ‘illusion of stability’, an erroneous belief that
programme are under control (Butler and Gray, 2006, Cleden, 2009). This mode of reliability
requires communication of rich, real-time information about the health of the system and any
anomalies or incidents (Weick, 1987). Achieving reliability in conditions of high volatility by
means of adjustment was surprisingly absent in our study. Our data did reveal that cross
organisational and cross functional communication in both Alpha and Beta was inaccurate,
insufficient and ambiguous.
Fire fighting: restoring reliability
In fire fighting mode, unpredictability and uncontrollability is high but the number of options
available to programme managers is low. Under these conditions “even small deviations in
the elements of the market, technology, or other factors in the system can ramify throughout
the system” (Roe and Schulman, 2008, p. 46). In such settings it is crucial for everyone to
take responsibility – the buck stops everywhere – it is everyone’s duty to intervene if they
have a concern, to stop errors escalating and prevent failure (Roberts, 1990a). Such
situations create high levels of anxiety and pressure. Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) demonstrate
how, in times of elevated stress or high error potential, expertise and experience is more
highly valued than rank in decision making. Under conditions of intense stress or high
hazard operations, HROs exhibit elevated levels of collaboration and collegiality. Groups
exhibit ‘heedful interrelating’ and ‘collective mindfulness’ (Weick and Roberts, 1993).
Weick (1993) demonstrates that developing situational awareness and understanding are
critical. Rather than the linear strategic thinking evident in most programmes sensemaking
requires,
“contextual rationality. It is built out of vague questions, muddy answers, and
negotiated agreements that attempt to reduce confusion." (Weick, 1993, p. 636)
Our study shows that reliability can break down in this state when individuals are confused
and unclear on the limits of autonomy and discretion. Heedfulness is also impeded when
there is a lack of trust, respect and honesty. In these situations people are inclined to diffuse
responsibility for action to others (Latané and Darley, 1970). Rather than technical risk
management systems, the key to reliability in situations of high volatility and low options is
the provision of support mechanisms to “help people cope with complexity under pressure to
achieve success” (Hollnagel et al., 2006). Our data show that these support mechanisms were
not evident in Alpha and Beta. The fire fighting, therefore, had consequences. Respondents
reported high levels of personal stress, relationships between members of the programme
team were fraught and problems left unresolved.
Deactivating: enforcing reliability
In the final state, high programme volatility is reduced by removing components, restricting
or shutting down operations. Studies have shown that in high reliability organisations
employees are empowered to abort operations regardless of rank and are commended for
their decision even if it turns out to be a false alarm. In extreme cases, reliability can also be
enforced by an outside body such as a regulator. During this mode, predetermined crisis
management and business continuity processes are imposed to limit damage. Management in
this mode tends to be command and control. Extensive dialogue, negotiation and patience are
required to overcome the potential tensions between the stakeholders to share the burden
(costs) of enforcing reliability. Forms of relational contracting as practised in, for example,
Heathrow’s Terminal 5 programme (Gil, 2009), may be seen as a means of balancing and
achieving agreement on seemingly incompatible interests in volatile environments.
In our study, neither Beta nor Alpha required the enforcement of reliability. However, it is
interesting to note that, like the engineers at Morton Thiokol in the ill-fated Challenger
disaster, technical experts in our study could only make a ‘recommendation’ (albeit a ‘strong’
recommendation) to abort operations but had no power to enforce deactivation.
CONCLUSIONS
By comparing and contrasting the salient features of programme environments and HROs and
presenting an in-depth case study with two embedded units of analysis (two troubled IS
programmes), we have demonstrated that programme reliability is currently challenging to
accomplish, sustain, restore and enforce in contexts where there is high potential for loss,
interactive complexity and competing goals and interests. To achieve programme reliability,
four key changes are required from all stakeholders: fostering programme reliability as a
basic value and a willingness to sacrifice short term efficiency and productivity goals to
ensure medium term mission delivery; enabling a decentralised system to coexist in a
centralised world; undertaking a deep and critical examination of weak signals and discrepant
events; and, finally, nurturing a readiness to invest in redundancy, even when these seemingly
‘slack’ resources are rarely utilised.
These general recommendations mirror existing literature on high reliability organisations,
which tends to offer a singular set of organisational characteristics that are seemingly
applicable to a broad range of contexts. Our study provides a more nuanced, contingency
framework, suggesting that the strategies used to accomplish, sustain, restore or enforce
programme reliability need to match the volatility in the programme environment. Volatility
is the degree to which the programme faces uncontrollable changes or unpredictable
conditions (Roe and Schulman, 2008). A mismatch between the strategies adopted and
environmental conditions is likely to intensify rather than attenuate levels of adversity in
programmes. Further, not only have we identified four different approaches to programme
reliability but have also highlighted that, to be effective, each mode requires a different set of
assumptions, practices, mechanisms and support structures.
Given the spate of IS programme failure, creating programme reliability arguably should
constitute a new and critical mission for the programme management community. Further,
developing the concept of programme reliability might help programme managers not only to
better manage the unexpected but also use adversity as a springboard for high performance in
the future.
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